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Although this essay will speak mostly to why and how I read the Analects of Confucius, the 
reason I entitle it “Why We Read the Analects” is not that I claim to speak for everyone but only 
that my personal reading follows from what others have thought and said about it. Ever since 
Confucius’ disciples recorded his sayings, teachings and example in the Fifth Century CE, later 
generations have been inspired to pass it on, to share it with others who have read, reflected on it, 
and discussed it together. Thus the Analects are still read because they have survived this 
scrutiny and reexamination over the centuries, which is why we read it today, not because it 
became part of a fixed canon (though in some places it did) or was required reading imposed by 
one generation upon the next. 
I have read and discussed the Analects with students in my Asian Humanities class for 60 
years and their response to it is much the same, whether they are majoring in the natural or social 
sciences or in the humanities. So, for practical purposes, when I speak of “Why We Read the 
Analects” it means “How I and my students have read the Analects together,” and especially how 
one’s first impressions are formed by the early chapters. Indeed it is no different for other 
audiences of any age or at any level, including adult education. If this is what is meant by 
“general” education, then the Analects speak to the generality of human beings – to their 
common, perennial, “core” concerns, more than to the farthest outreaches of abstract thought. 
This is why I avoid speaking of what I do as “teaching” the Analects. No doubt a teacher can 
help students with their reading and reflection upon the text, but basically students are 
rediscovering it and learning it for themselves. The book teaches itself, as of course most 
genuine “classics” do. Whatever may be done by a teacher is only an enhancement of the 
reader’s own personal encounter in recognizing that the text speaks directly to him or herself. 
For me the latest confirmation of this fact comes from the valedictory address of a Columbia 
College graduate in 2008 who chose to sum up his four years’ learning experience by drawing on 
the model of the Analects and some of its key sayings.
1
 Understandably our valedictorian drew 
first on the opening lines, which read: 
 
The Master said: To study and at times to practice what one has learned, is that not a 
pleasure? To have friends coming from afar, is that not a joy? To be unembittered even if 
one is not recognized, is that not to be a truly noble person?
2
 
 
If one wishes to know more of what our valedictorian made of these lines, one can refer to the 
Proceedings just cited. In what follows, despite my disclaimer of any originality or unique 
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expertise, I shall offer my own thoughts on these lines and other key passages that mark the 
Analects as classic. 
Taken together these opening lines tell us much about the nature and context of the Analects. 
The first lines could be addressed to and understood by any literate human being, but the last line 
points more specifically to “the noble person [junzi].” Here junzi refers to the traditional 
leadership elite, an aristocratic class born to a privileged status of would-be rulers. But Confucius 
emphasizes the learning process for what it takes to be worthy of a leadership role or become an 
exemplary person; in other words, what it means to command respect as a person, whether or not 
one finds oneself in a position to lead or rule. Thus he reconceives the traditional concept of junzi 
from that of “nobleman” to one that emphasizes “the noble man [or person]” as one whose 
personal character, not status, establishes him as a model to be followed – a true leader in any 
social role whatever, even if not successful politically.
3
 
The same multi-faceted expression zi also appears as the very first word in the Analects: “The 
Master said [zi yue].” As “Master” zi could be applied to other authority figures like Laozi and 
Zhungzi, and here it clearly refers to a teacher, but the language that follows marks Confucius as 
distinct from any teacher who is simply dictating or preaching to his students or disciples. 
Note the rhetorical cast of all three of the statements above; they are not outright assertions, 
much less forceful dictates. They invite and expect an implicit response from the hearer as if 
one’s own experience would immediately confirm the truth of what Confucius is saying – he is 
only telling them in a sense what they already know, without invoking any higher authority. 
This is not the thunderous voice of the prophet, or a pronouncement from the pulpit or 
podium. Old Testament prophets spoke first of all to God, and then delivered God’s word to His 
people. Confucius speaks directly to us, and asks us to recognize Heaven within and around us.  
His appeal to ordinary human experience is also the ground on which he talks of studying or 
learning. What he says may be addressed to the individual, calling on one personally to achieve 
fulfillment as a truly noble person, but his hearers are learning from others as well as from their 
own experience and practice, and their “others” here include teachers, examples from the past, as 
well as “friends coming from afar” with whom one can share one’s experience – it is learning 
that can be gained from (being open to) both the past and others able to confirm and expand on 
one’s own knowledge. 
But if I have distinguished Confucius’ voice from that of the Old Testament prophet, this does 
not mean that there is no common ground between them, both speak to an ideal standard by 
which to measure and judge the conduct of kings and rulers, and by implication anyone else who 
bears a responsibility for others – which means just about all of us. 
In Confucius’ case however, the approach is most characteristically on the means of self-
cultivation by which one can develop the virtues of the Noble Person, understood as a fulfillment 
of the human ideal. And most characteristic of Confucianism too is the way the Analects explain 
this as an organic growth following the pattern of ordinary human life. 
Accordingly, in the passage immediately following that quoted above, the Analects speak of 
that process as grounded in the life of the family, wherein, initially by acquiring habits of 
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respectful conduct toward others – first of all towards parents and then to one’s siblings – one 
engenders traits essential to human life, whether one’s own – in the self – or in others. Thus the 
second passage concludes, “The noble person concerns himself with the root, when the root is 
established, the Way is born. Being filial and fraternal – is this not the root of humaneness?” 
(1:2). 
Again the rhetorical mode – appealing to anyone’s first experience of life – conveys the sense 
that the living process is interactive and interpersonal. But here the process is identified as one 
by which “the Way” is born, takes life. And in the context of the preceding passages this is also 
understood to be the Way that a truly noble person follows. 
At the same time this Way is centered in humaneness as the prime virtue of the Noble Person, 
a virtue that links the self-fulfillment of the exemplary person to the fulfillment of others. But 
fulfillment is the product of a sequential process for anyone and everyone. Filiality is the seed 
from which, with due cultivation, the growth process can be fulfilled in the flowering of 
humaneness or true humanity. In this respect filiality may be considered the genetic virtue of 
Confucianism – important in its priority – but its full fruit or flower is humaneness (consummate 
virtue). 
There is a widespread impression that filiality is the most characteristic virtue of 
Confucianism, and this notion is not just a modern misconception or misreading by foreign 
observers. The early critic of the Confucian school, Mozi, seized on this family virtue as almost 
an obsession of the Confucians he knew. And the early Legalists also took issue with the 
Confucians on this issue, seeing a family ethic rooted in filiality as prejudicial to public-
mindedness on a wider scale (as indeed Mozi had). Moreover the powerful hold of filiality on 
Confucian culture was demonstrated by the resistance it showed to Buddhism on the latter’s 
introduction to China. 
But before we pursue this issue further, we do well to note another early reference to filiality 
in the Analects. When a disciple Mang Wu Bo is quoted as asking Confucius about filiality or 
filial piety [xiao], the terse answer given is somewhat perplexing in its obliqueness: “Parents’ 
only concern should be lest their children be sick” (2:6). 
Traditional commentators have tended to interpret this as implying primarily an obligation on 
the child to take proper care of itself – attending to one’s own person in bodily and moral health. 
No doubt this was a distinct and enduring feature of Confucian teaching and practice, and its 
strong sense of the person as a bodily self is what offered resistance to Buddhist questioning of 
the reality of any substantial self. But one should not ignore the underlying assumption here that 
the filial child is responding to the loving concern of his parents. Filiality is a reflection of 
parental love. It partakes of the basic Confucian principle of reciprocity, in the light of which 
filiality is to be seen, not as an absolute value requiring blind obedience to parents, but a relative 
one to the extent that it is qualified and conditioned by a parental love that is taken for granted in 
the passage just quoted – among the many natural assumptions underlying Confucian discourse.  
Another later anecdote in the Analects underscores the same point. Confucius’ disciple Zai 
Wo asked him about the customary three years’ mourning for one’s parents, expressing the 
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thought that one year’s mourning should be enough. Confucius asked him, “If you were to eat 
good food and wear fine clothing, would you feel at ease?” [Zai Wo responded] “I would feel at 
ease.” 
 
If you would feel at ease [replied Confucius], then do it. But the noble person throughout the 
mourning period derives no pleasure from the food that he eats, no joy from the music that 
he hears, and no comfort from his dwelling. But you would feel at ease and so you should 
do it.” After Wo went out, the Master said “How inhuman Yü [Zai Wo] is! Only when a 
child is three years old does it leave its parents’ arms. The three years’ mourning is the 
universal custom everywhere under Heaven. And Yü, was he not the darling of his father 
and mother for three years? (17:21) 
 
In this case Confucius shows a basic respect for the essentially voluntary character of ethical 
behavior while he also upholds the standards of reciprocity that should ordinarily apply. The 
standard, however, presumes that natural feeling should underlie and prompt one’s actions. It 
would do no good to make a pretense of virtue. Thus natural feelings of reciprocity engendered 
in the normal process of life, from birth and infancy to maturity, are the root of humaneness as in 
the earlier example. 
The primacy of natural sentiments born in the bosom of the family is underscored by another 
episode in which the Duke of She tells Confucius: 
 
“In our part of the country there is one upright Gong. His father stole a sheep and the son 
bore witness against him.” Confucius says: “In our part of the country, the upright are 
different than that. A father is shielded by his son, and a son is shielded by his father. 
Uprightness lies in this. (13:18)  
 
In other words, the intimacy of the family is privileged over the claims of the state, for the state 
cannot stand if trust within the family – the root of public trust – is undermined.  
Soon after this the primacy of sentiment or feeling over rational discourse was reaffirmed for 
Confucians in the Mencius when he defined the goodness of human nature as moral awareness 
(literally, “good knowing” or natural knowledge [liang zhih]), and further when he defined the 
basic relationship or bond between parent and child, not in terms of filiality, but as one of 
“intimate affection” or mutual love, to be cultivated of course in the light of reason (the sense of 
right and wrong [yi]). 
But since from the outset of the Analects, as in all the literate discourse its readers are engaged 
in, there is the possibility that verbalization and rationalization might intrude on one’s ordinary 
conduct, it is important that what one learns and says be guided and informed by both one’s own 
feelings and one’s consciousness of right and wrong [yi]. Thus the Analects early exposition of 
the Way of Humaneness includes the following: 
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A young man is to be filial within his family and respectful outside it. He is to be earnest 
and faithful, overflowing with love for all living beings and intimate with those who are 
humane. If after such practice he has strength to spare, he may use it in the study of literate 
culture [wen]. (1:6) 
 
Although the importance of study and learning had already been asserted in the opening lines, 
and Confucian scholarship became widely known among East Asian teachings as the most 
rational, here the priority of moral cultivation over literate discourse [wen], essential though the 
latter was to civilized life, is established early on in the Analects. 
We saw in the opening lines how the process of learning started first by interaction with 
others, but ended with the Noble Person able to stand, so to speak, on his own. He knew where 
he stood regardless of the approval or disapproval of others. This is not the same as a radical 
individuality asserting its complete autonomy, but rather a self in a state of personal balance or 
poise. The same conception then informs our understanding of other Confucian values connected 
with the Noble Person as a model of humaneness. In Chapter 1:4, one of Confucius’ closest 
disciples is quoted approvingly as follows: 
 
Everyday I examine myself on three things: In planning on behalf of others, have I failed to 
be loyal? When dealing with friends have I failed to be trustworthy? In receiving what has 
been transmitted, have I failed to practice it? 
 
Among each of these cases there is a connection or continuity that involves more than an 
obedient adherence to or following of others. “Loyalty” (as zhong is usually translated) is 
represented by the graph for “center” underlain by the graph for “mind-and-heart”; it bespeaks a 
centered mind and heart, in a state of balance within the self but also balanced with others. It 
means being true to oneself as well as to others (not just following or obeying the latter). This 
then connects up with the other two values cited. “Trustworthiness” is our rendering here for xin, 
sometimes also translated as “good faith”, both of which express the idea that one’s actions and 
conduct are consistent with one’s stated professions, being true to one’s word.4 
This same notion is implicit in Confucian “loyalty”, being true at once to one’s self and 
others, and it connects up with the faithful practice of one’s professions in service to others. 
Another notable passage in the Analects speaks of the “man of service” [shi], here roughly 
equivalent to the “noble person”, in the following terms: 
 
The man of service cannot but be stout-hearted and enduring; for his burden is heavy and his 
way is long. To be truly humane is the burden he bears; Is it not heavy? Only in death does 
his practice of the Way come to an end; Is that not long? (8:7)  
 
Here the burden of humaneness is heavy because service to others which is also true to oneself, 
can be exacting and demanding of one’s own inner resources. Whether in a position of leadership 
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or sharing in the responsibilities of government, to be truly reliable and trustworthy meant to be 
fully honest with oneself and unflinchingly forthright in advising others. Often it would involve 
courageous honesty in counseling rulers who might resent hearing the truth, especially about 
themselves.  
In the Confucian tradition of civil service, especially in ministerial roles, this courageous 
honesty was the hallmark of true loyalty on the part of those who were “stout-hearted and 
enduring” even to the point of martyrdom, when the true scholar/official’s Way ended in death at 
the hands of a despotic ruler. 
But being true to one’s word and professions had an importance beyond the individual in 
Confucius’ whole scheme of things. A prime vocation for the man of service was the business of 
human governance and the Analects has much to say about this. Here a few examples may 
suffice: 
 
When a disciple asked Confucius about government, the latter replied tersely, “Sufficient 
food, sufficient military strength and the confidence (trust) of the people [are the three 
requisites].” When asked further “if unavoidably one had to dispense with any of these 
three, which of them would you forego?” the Master replied, “Let go of the military 
strength.” The disciple next asked: If one had, unavoidably, to dispense with one of the 
remaining two, which should go first? The Master said, “Do without the food, for from of 
old there has always been death, but without such confidence (trust) a people cannot stand. 
(12:7)  
 
Mutual trust, among the people and their leaders, is thus the most essential ingredient of any 
human society – a principle that underlies another response of Confucius to the question of what 
is essential to government: 
 
Should you try to lead them by means of regulations or keep order among them through 
laws and punishments, the people will evade these and lack any sense of shame. Lead them 
[on the other hand] by personal virtue [de] and keep order among them through rites [li], 
then the people, having a sense of shame, will correct themselves. (2:3) 
 
Here Confucius’ depreciation of laws and punishment fits with his eschewal of coercive force 
(“military strength”) except as a possible backup and not as a first choice, in the passage just 
cited before. For him voluntarism is the basic predicate of any human society, as it had been 
traditionally in households cooperatively engaged in family-managed agriculture. One can rely 
better on a person’s or people’s sense of self -respect (the corollary of “the sense of shame” 
referred to here) to motivate people’s cooperation with their leaders; as the latter’s personal 
virtue should exhibit exemplary self-respect combined with respect for others. 
Note however that personal virtue and respect alone are not enough; the rites are especially 
involved and indispensable. This is because rites and proper customs establish practical norms of 
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conduct that are themselves voluntaristic and cooperative – educational and not coercive. They 
are the means by which the self, in the normal process of life, engages with others. They give 
form to things, forms and norms naturally conducive to the harmonious development of human 
relations or political action. 
This is the basis for the “harmony” that others have seen as the keynote of Confucianism, 
whether they always understood its voluntarism or cooperation in the same terms. When Prince 
Shōtoku in seventh century CE Japan tried to incorporate Confucianism in its first formal 
constitution, the first word was “Harmony” and it is followed by his exhortation on behalf of a 
consensual society. Much later, after the Communists in China recoiled from the vicious class 
struggle of the Cultural Revolution, they turned back, at least in name, to Confucian Harmony as 
an essential Chinese value to undergird “Chinese Socialism”. 
Much more is said in the Analects about the rites (or ritual decorum) in daily life, as it relates 
to personal and social health. But I am limiting myself in this essay only to a few keynotes one 
encounters in a first reading that give us initial bearings on what follows in the text. 
 
In the remainder of this essay I wish to focus on something no less important to one’s reading 
of the Analects than his key teachings: the image of Confucius and his sense of personal vocation 
and mission. This image of him has shown through the pages of the Analects as almost more 
compelling and memorable even than his teachings and aphorisms, to such an extent that, despite 
his own disclaimers of his disciples’ attributions of sagehood to him, among latter-day 
Confucians the picture of him as he appeared in the Analects became the very model of The Sage 
(though none could hardly boast of emulating the modesty of the Sage). 
The first thing to be noted is his becoming modesty and lack of pretension to great personal 
authority, already implicit in the conversational mode of the opening lines. He did not claim to 
be proclaiming any new order or teaching. “I am a transmitter, not a creator” (7:1) he said. 
Whether he was actually creative in the process of transmitting, i.e., in his interpretation and 
exposition of ancient ideals, is another question, but posterity has generally judged him so. One 
must also allow for the possibility that, “in transmitting” what he had received from past 
tradition, he was being more than just conservative. The upholding of past ideals could also seem 
as a critique of existing institutions that failed to measure up. Thus one episode in Confucius’ 
teaching career portrays him, in the course of his travels, sending a disciple to ask directions 
from a farmer along the way, who when he learns that the disciple’s master is Confucius, 
recognizes the latter as a would be counselor to rulers, going from state to state looking for one 
who would take his advice.  
 
The farmer bespeaks a skeptical view of this mission; he regards the world as so unruly that 
the best one can do is attend to his own field. “Instead following a scholar who distances 
himself from one ruler after another, it would be better to follow one who withdraws from 
the whole world of men.” 
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When the disciple reported this to Confucius, the Master sighed and said: 
One cannot herd with the beasts or flock with the birds. If I am not to go along in the 
company of other human beings, with whom should I associate? If the Way prevailed in the 
world, I would not be trying to change things.” (18.6) 
 
Mere “transmitter” though he was, Confucius saw his mission as trying to change things. 
Received tradition itself contained the seeds of reform, the need to rectify evils that would not 
just resolve themselves. 
Confucius was known in his time as a scholar persistent in his call to be of public service, but 
equally for his diffidence in serving any ruler whose actions were inconsistent with his own 
principles. On another occasion someone asked Confucius, “Why does the master not take part in 
government?” The master said “What do the Documents [The Book of History] say about being 
filial? Be filial. Just being filial and being friendly with one’s brothers contributes to the 
government. Why should one have to take office to do this?” (2:21). Again Confucius’s answer 
is somewhat terse and a little oblique, but it takes us back to where we started in the Analects: 
filiality as the value underlying all social and civic virtue. Public service is not performed only 
by those in office; anyone who practices and promotes such civic virtues is rendering a public 
service. And indeed the practice of such values is the precondition for anyone who might qualify 
for office. Elsewhere Confucius says: 
 
One should not be anxious about having an official position but about having the 
wherewithal to hold office. One should not be anxious about not being recognized [for 
office] but about not being worthy of such recognition. (4:14) 
 
Again we are taken back to the starting point of our reading: the Noble Person who can stand on 
his own even if he is not recognized. The course he has followed (and we in following the 
Analects thus far) is summed up in Confucius’ own brief summation of his life experience: 
 
At 15 I set my heart on learning. At 30 I was established in its pursuit. By 40 I had no great 
doubts [about what I was doing]. At 50 I heard what Heaven commanded of me. At 60 I 
could heed it. At 70 I could follow my heart’s desire without transgressing. (2:4) 
 
In the light of our previous discussion we may be able to fill in the spaces in this spare outline of 
his personal history. That it starts with learning we already know. That it takes time to learn from 
the past and others’ experience we can readily understand. Confucius’ growing from adolescence 
to increasing security at 30 and maturity at 40 – these are familiar stages in the life process. What 
may be somewhat unexpected is that only at 50 did he “hear” what Heaven expected of him. The 
language used here for “Heaven’s command” is itself not unfamiliar, but earlier it had referred to 
what is usually translated as “The Mandate of Heaven” [tian ming], a claim made by rulers or 
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their spokesman to justify their taking power and exercising authority, ostensibly in the name of 
Heaven. 
For Confucius that claim could only be considered legitimate if in fact the ruler or his dynasty 
ruled virtuously on behalf of the people. And it is this sense of responsibility attaching to the 
claim of legitimacy or public trust that is key to Confucius’ understanding of Heaven’s command 
or charge. 
Confucius himself was in no position to rule. At some point nevertheless he must have felt 
that he had some capacity and obligation to make use of what he had learned on behalf of the 
public good. (Whether or not this occurred exactly at 50 in this schematic sequence is not the 
point.) More significant is that Confucius takes this change upon himself personally; it is not just 
a political concept applying to dynastic rulers, but a charge or commission Heaven was 
entrusting directly to himself. 
We are already aware from other references to Heaven in the Analects that Confucius felt 
some personal relation to it – a kind of religious relationship between Heaven theistically 
conceived (divine creator) and its creation. Heaven spoke directly and personally to him and he 
had a filial obligation to listen. 
Confucianism may not be thought of as a “religion” in the usual sense, but Confucius bespoke 
a reverential attitude toward Heaven, and the deep respect in which he held all life was a 
reflection of this. In response to questions put to him by disciples about the Noble Person, he 
said: “He cultivates himself with reverence” (14:45), and even more to the point here: “Without 
knowing (or understanding) what Heaven has ordained [tian ming], i.e., its charge or command, 
one has no way to become a Noble Person” (20:3). Indeed, the attitude and virtue of reverence 
remained a key element in later Confucianism. It was not a purely secular ethic as some have 
supposed it to be. 
But if Heaven charged Confucius personally with a responsibility for public service, we know 
already how conflicted he was about taking office and we can understand the difficulty he might 
face in trying to carry out that charge. This is perhaps why it took him time (here, another ten 
years) actually to “heed” what we he had heard earlier, i.e., to find a way to resolve his 
conscience in this regard. 
My own supposition is that his resolution of the matter was in keeping with the response he 
gave to those who had questioned him about his refusal to take office: both in the given 
circumstances and in the larger scheme of things; taking office was not the only way to fulfill 
one’s obligation to be of service to Heaven and humankind. Teaching was also a public service 
when it contributed to the individual’s and people’s education on behalf of the public trust. 
Finally when we are told that at 70 Confucius had satisfied his heart’s desire, we are reminded 
that at 15 he had “set his heart on learning,” and so the outcome – his satisfaction as a scholar 
and teacher in lieu of an official career – fulfilled not only that early aspiration but also any 
political ambitions he might have had, in carrying out Heaven’s charge to him. This was not 
accomplished without struggle of the kind that one might endure who had to bear the burden of 
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humaneness to the end. It was, after all, an end marked by some measure of satisfaction and 
fulfillment. 
To be sure this was not exactly a supreme epiphany or sudden moment of enlightenment, but 
rather a threshold of accumulated learning and experience. Nor does it, on the other hand, result 
from the sort of profound confrontation with evil and suffering that we see, say, in St. Augustine 
or Dostoyevsky. In such a range of perspectives, one could see it as a relatively optimistic or 
even idealistic view of life. But it is reassuring for those who have followed him in the Analects 
to believe that this good man could live out a life worthy of a truly Noble Man – the goal he set 
out for himself at the start. 
 
Epilogue 
 
The foregoing is just one among several ways of explaining why or how we read the Analects. 
There are others too. However important it is to read the text directly and personally, the one we 
read always bears the imprint of the tradition that has passed it on. And if we want to know how 
others have received and understood it, showing a decent respect for the opinions of readers and 
writers before us in other places and times, we might go on to consider how it was understood by 
those who had a major impact on other civilized peoples. 
This would be especially true of those East Asian peoples whose education was structured in 
the form given by the pervasive Neo-Confucian movement from the Eleventh to the Nineteenth 
centuries. In this long pre-modern period the Analects was read as one of the so-called “Four 
Books”, a special packaging of the Confucian classics mainly attributed to the great Neo-
Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi (1130–1200 CE). In that form the Analects was not the first thing 
one read. It came after text of the Great Learning, a chapter from the Record of Rites [Liji] 
attributed to Confucius’ disciple Zengzi, which was provided with a special preface and 
commentary by Zhu Xi that he thought propedeutic to any reading of the other classics included 
in the Four Books. Thus how one read the Analects itself was conditioned by Zhu’s own way of 
introducing us to “How to Read a Book.” The book is still a classic, but now the product of a 
subsequent tradition, so this is not exactly the same as “reading it in the original.” Zu Xi was 
now presenting it in a form adapted to his own age, in which “new age” Confucians, i.e. Neo-
Confucians, responded to the challenge of Mahayana Buddhism by providing a metaphysical 
explanation to accompany the text. The basic message remained the same as Zhu Xi summed it 
up in his preface: “Self-cultivation for the Governance of Humankind” [xiuji zhiren], a 
memorable slogan in later literature. Now however it was elaborated on in terms of a new 
cosmology and a more sophisticated philosophy of human nature [dao xue and xingli xue].
5
  
It did not take long however for even this Neo-Confucian version of the traditional classic to 
be called into question by text critics in the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth centuries, who pointed 
out differences between these supposed “classic” or traditional Four Books and the versions that 
had been “classic” before. This led inevitably to efforts by modern critics to rediscover or 
reconstruct “the original Analects.” If we want to incorporate any of these new versions into our 
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own core curriculum, however, which are we to choose? No working curriculum that tries to 
provide a humanities component for undergraduate education (or even alongside graduate 
training) can get into all of the complexities that this historical development entails. If we read 
what some modern scholar reconstructs as The Original Analects, it is not what traditional 
education in East Asia would have recognized, nor what would have entered into the intellectual 
and moral formation of generations of East Asians. It would simply be another academic 
discovery. 
There is no perfect solution to this educational dilemma, but if we are wiling to think of 
working, rather than final, solutions, we can try to provide a repertoire of approaches by which 
one can adapt these resources to different educational situations and different levels of learning. 
The important thing is that the first reading be a personal encounter with a classic text (however 
“classic” may be interpreted), and that it be understood as only a first reading, to be followed up 
as best one can by more or other readings.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1. See Proceedings of the Conference on Classics for an Emerging World, Columbia University, 
January 19–20, 2008, published by the University Committee on Asia and the Middle East, New 
York, 2008. 
2. All translations are by the author. 
3. In the context of the times one understands that junzi refers most directly to male heirs of the 
aristocracy, but the second half of the compound –zi is literally “child” and not gender specific. 
Thus later Japanese empresses could appropriate to themselves the expression tianzi, normally 
understood in China as “Son of Heaven.” They were clearly open to their own hereditary claim to 
be a “child of Heaven” regardless of gender. Still later in China jun could be a suffix applied to 
women as well. 
4. Ezra Pound, as a poet and amateur translator playing around with the Analects, notes that the 
character for xin (trust) included the graph for man or person at the left and the graph for “word” 
or “saying” bedside it on the right, which suggested to him the felicitous rendering of it as “man 
standing by his word.” 
5. Incidentally, this is how the Analects was reported on by the American art critic Ernest Fenollosa, 
who read it in a Japanese edition of the Four Books and handed it on to people like Ezra Pound. 
But this is what we all do – read it on the recommendation of someone else in a form more or less 
adapted to the latest scene. 
